Location: Mathare, Nairobi, Kenya

Organizers:
The Spatial Collective
Shack/Slum Dwellers International

Background: The community of Mathare in Nairobi, Kenya, is not marked on any official map of the city. On Google Maps, its streets appear as blank spots near a hospital and a road. However, Mathare is a large, densely-packed slum, with narrow streets and hundreds of residents. Like many slums in the developing world, Mathare is invisible on maps because residents are illegal squatters without formal land tenure, despite de facto possession of the land: in some cases, such as in Mumbai’s Dharavi settlement, multiple generations have lived on the same plot without formal recognition of land ownership land. There are many causes of such persistent landlessness, including marginalization of slumdwellers from government institutions; inadequate capacity of the cadastre system to register new property owners; loss of property records due to recent conflict; competing property claims and interests; and entrenched political considerations. For many of these settlements, invisibility on a map is just one manifestation of their broader absence (whether intentional or structural) from the governance systems.

The precarious status of property ownership often contributes to continued poverty and public health problems, as residents lack the security to invest in housing upgrades and cannot post their property as collateral against loans; additionally, municipalities are reluctant to extend basic services such as clean water or garbage collection to properties with unresolved claims.

Program: As a first step towards overcoming land ownership barriers to development, residents of Mathare have joined with local and international NGOs to map their communities using Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). Members of the Spatial Collective use GPS data, an online platform, and street-level photographs, to not just put streets on the map: they’re adding points-of-interest like schools, shops, and churches, as well as informal dumping grounds and broken infrastructure to give a detailed record of the community Mathare residents have built. Such documentation helps negotiate residents’ rights in discussions with local authorities.

A similar initiative by a member of Slum Dwellers International documents building footprints and public spaces (such as streets) in Mathare using regularly updated satellite images. In 2013, the map was used to assist the local utility run a communal water line into Mathare for the first time. At first residents were hesitant to move their homes in order to allow construction of the subterranean pipe: strong urbanization pressures mean there are no guarantees they could reclaim their plot when work finished. However the map acted as a precise community memory of their ownership, assuaging doubts and allowing construction to proceed, plot by plot. While not final solutions to the complex problems related to land tenure, such mapping initiatives enable residents to begin negotiating with municipal authorities by proving the existence and intricacies of their communities.

Transferability: Low-cost mapping techniques are increasingly being used around the world as a grassroots way of recording ownership, lobbying for services, and gaining political influence. The spread of information and communication technologies has enabled this work, especially due to the deep penetration of cellular networks in the developing world. The addition of cameras to cell phones is adding another layer to mapping, allowing on-the-ground photos to be synced with GPS coordinates. There are many examples of this work: for instance in 2012 a World Bank-sponsored project in the Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania neighborhood of Tandale earned international acclaim through a TED Talk (~10:00). For further information on mapping and more project examples, refer to the topic on the Shack/Slum Dwellers International site.

Images credit of NPR

UN-Habitat’s Best Practices and Local Leadership Programme (BLP) was created in 1997 in order to identify and showcase innovative, exemplary projects of sustainable development, especially in urban areas. Members of the Program vet and select nominations from around the world, ultimately choosing a handful of notable “Best Practices,” defined as programs and interventions that have “made a lasting contribution to improving the quality of life and the sustainability of cities and communities.”All Best Practices are peer-reviewed and have been successfully implemented in the field. Together with Good or Promising practices, the winning practices comprise a database of over 4,000 projects as of 2012.

The Program’s members form a global network of grassroots organizations, government agencies, and academic institutions, including specialists in housing, urban planning and development, environmental management, architecture, economic development, social inclusion, crime prevention, cultural heritage, municipal finance and management, infrastructure and social services, among others.  The contest is held bi-annually.

I2UD is a member of the BLP, and reviews nominees every two years. Below are links to the winners from 2012, and a link to the database. What programs await for you to discover?

Main database: http://www.unhabitat.org/bp/bp.list.aspx

Project Title	Organization Type	Country	Year
Affordable Housing for Sub-Saharan Africa	Non-governmental Organisation	Burkina-Faso	2012
Chapelview Apartments	Private Sector	Canada	2012
Dubai Metro Red Line	Local Authority	United Arab Emirates (UAE)	2012
Lindfen City Public Toilets	Local Authority	China	2012
Operation Big Blue Association	Non-governmental Organisation	Lebanon	2012
Program of Organic Vegetable Gardens at School	Foundation	Uruguay	2012
Revo-Loo-Tionizing Rural Markets for Sanitation	-	Cambodia	2012
Sport Inspires Me	Local Authority	Portugal	2012
Children’s Participation as the Basis for Citizenship	Professional Association	Spain	2012
Un Techo para mi Pais	Non-governmental Organisation	Chile	2012
Water Conservator – Extrema, Brazil	Local Authority	Brazil	2012
Women empowerment in harsh climatic and social-cultural environment	Non-governmental Organisation	Kenya	2012

]]> http://ori.i2ud.org/2013/08/un-habitats-best-practices-and-local-leadership-program/feed/ 0 http://ori.i2ud.org/2013/08/flood-management-in-curitiba-metoropolitan-area-brazil/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=flood-management-in-curitiba-metoropolitan-area-brazil http://ori.i2ud.org/2013/08/flood-management-in-curitiba-metoropolitan-area-brazil/#comments Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:10:21 +0000 Warren http://i2ud.org/?p=4880 Continue Reading]]> Topics:
Flood Prevention
Integrated Water Management Planning

Location: Curitiba, Brazil

Organizers:
Curitibal Metropolitan Area
World Bank

Year: 2004

Background: The Curitiba Metropolitan Area (RMC) is on the Upper Iguacu River Basin and had a population of 2.5 million in 2004. The river has a low capacity and historically has flooded frequently, giving rise to a large natural flood plain unsuitable for development. Several factors related to urban growth exacerbated the natural flood risks. First, beginning in the 1980s, growth pressures resulted in unauthorized development of the flood plain. Secondly, the growth of impermeable surfaces (representing up to 40% of the surface area of some basin tributaries) increased flooding in the basin six-fold. with the downtown flooding the most frequently. Finally, poor urban drainage  works and infrastructure such as bridges obstructed river flow.

A 100-year precipitation and flood event in January 1995, however, caused more than USD $40 million in damages and caused the city to rethink its flood management strategy. One solution proposed would have been to increase the depth of the river, as had been done in Sao Paolo in 1986. This would have reduced the frequency of flooding in the short term, but would also lead to more unauthorized occupation in the sensitive floodplain, spread of impermeable surfaces, and ultimately worse devastation during a flood event. This option would also have been costly, having cost more than a billion dollars in Sao Paolo.

Program: In 1996, the RMC adopted an alternative strategy for flood management as part of a sanitation program developed by the World Bank. Following a series of studies on the site, the central intervention was the creation of a large public park around the main river and flood plain. The state bought the land along the river and resettled the population to other areas. An artificial channel was dug to help increase the river capacity, as well as act as a border to prevent growth into the park. Some areas were reserved for constructed wetlands to improve water quality, and a flood warning system was developed. Critically, the recreational function of the park, as well as the clear physical boundaries, reduced unauthorized occupation.

Following creation of the park, an Integrated Urban Drainage Master Plan was developed that called for a strategic system of urban parks in the tributaries. Safeguarded by land use regulations and law enforcement, these parks help absorb precipitation runoff. Regulatory measures including new river construction standards, tax incentives for maintaining conservation areas, and integration with the urban master plan were used to conserve the parks for water storage and source control. Data is now collected to help predict floods and inform the early-warning system. Technical capacity-building of public officials and public participation in the program’s development were other components that ensured the long-term sustainability of the interventions.

Source: This case study is featured by the Associated Programme for Flood Management. View more Case Studies on flood risk prevention and disaster management here:
http://www.apfm.info/?page_id=384

Background: Located on the bend of a river on a floodplain outside Manila, the community of Banaba is highly exposed to and frequently suffers from flooding during heavy rains. The slum neighborhood lacks flood prevention infrastructure. Furthermore, residents are economically vulnerable to disasters as they have limited options for relocation, improvement of their housing, or other insurance methods. Although the community had an evacuation plan in the event of heavy rains, the absence of reliable and timely flood prediction systems prevented the community from mobilizing quickly enough to avoid injuries and loss of valuable assets. Prior to the intervention, residents would rely on the alarmed cries of pigs to determine if river levels were high enough to warrant evacuation.

Banaba neighborhood. The strip of land between the sharp bends in the river is particularly flood-prone. Upstream communities in the highlands also report river data to University of the Philippines researchers

The pylons on this bridge have been painted to gauge river height. River measurements are typically taken twice a day. Abnormally large rises in height over time indicate flood risk.

Program: With funding and support from Christian Aid and UK Government, residents of Banaba teamed with researchers and hydrologists at the University of the Philippines to create an accurate flood prediction and early-warning system. University scientists trained residents to monitor and collect information related to flooding, particularly river height, speed of river rise, and meteorological information such as rainfall. In addition, residents communicate with upstream riparian communities that also monitor river metrics; the upstream communities can let Banaba residents know about weather events and river speed in their area. Data about river conditions are sent to the specialists at the University to be incorporated within river-system computer flood models. If the river conditions indicate imminent flooding according to the model, then an evacuation notice is sent out to the Banaba residents. The community follows its evacuation route to a community center. Regular monitoring of river conditions provides more data for researchers so that they may create earlier, more accurate evacuation predictions.

Transferability: The early-warning system is adapted to the Banaba context in two key ways. First, structural flood prevention – such as with levees or river bank armoring – would need to be extensive due to the site’s high vulnerability to flooding; such infrastructure is likely beyond the means of the low-income neighborhood. The simplicity of the monitoring tools and the partnership with the University reduces costs while maximizing life- and asset-saving measures. Secondly, the density of Metro Manila complicates relocation options for the community members; strict zoning would limit their access to economic opportunities. By working with residents to alert them to flood conditions, residents are able to make informed decisions about their residence.

• BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19977941
• Christian Aid: http://www.christianaid.org.uk/whatwedo/in-focus/big-river-rising/big-river-rising.aspx
• Scientific study about a similar approach in a different part of the Philippines, conducted by one of the scientists working with Christian Aid around the same time: http://www.academia.edu/1421084/Community-based_monitoring_for_flood_early_warning_system_AbonDavidTabios

Location: Khayelishta township, Western Cape Province, South Africa

Organizers:
City government of Cape Town
Community members

Background: Khayelishta township was created in the 1980s by the apartheid government as a way to depopulate the surrounding overcrowded townships. Since then, Khayelishta has been a magnet for rural-urban migration, an entry point to the greater Cape Town economy. Unfortunately, unemployment and crime rates are high. During apartheid, police had a limited presence in many townships as institutions preventing crime and maintaining public safety. Instead street committees, comprised of elders and other respected community members, tasked themselves with maintaining law and order, including punishing criminals. Police institutions began to work the streets in townships following the end of apartheid; but due to administrative deficits and an inherited lack of trust, street committees remained valuable enforcers of the law. Over time, however, the status and legitimacy of street committees have come in to question, and their influence overall has ebbed as formal institutions seek to assert their influence in township jurisdictions. This tension between formal and informal crime prevention methods – with neither one fully possessing the resources to completely fulfill their mandate – has created a vacuum within which crimes like daylight robberies and muggings continue to thrive.

Project: In order to address crime with the input of community members, the City of Cape Town has developed the Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading program (VPUU). The first step of the program is to conduct a Baseline Survey and draft a Crime Map, in order to get a sense of the frequency and spatial extent of crime in an area.

Crime map for an area of Khayelishta

Once the main points of crime have been identified in a neighborhood, the program identifies “Safe Node Areas” (SNAs): each SNA is targeted for redevelopment with the aim of reducing crime in that area, and in the community as a whole. Different interventions to improve safety are designed and proposed to the community. In keeping with an holistic approach to crime reduction, interventions either impact the physical environment (as with “Active Boxes” – safe spaces in which to take refuge during a crime situation) or the social dynamic (such as programs meant to mainstream crime awareness in local institutions). Following a “Package of Plans” approach that allows for comprehensive coordination and implementation of proposed projects, VPUU works with community members in many different SNAs to bring plans from concept to fruition.

Financing: At the beginning of the VPUU, a Social Development Fund was established in order to finance crime prevention programs. Three times per year, requests for proposals go out to each SNA. Successful projects’ participants are asked to contribute 10% of the amount awarded in either cash or in-kind contributions: this mechanism helps establish community ownership of the project.

Sources:

Active Box locations along major pedestrian routes

All the dwellings in Langrug are shacks

Background: Stellenbosch Municipality in Western Cape Province, South Africa, is world-renowned for the Franschoek winelands, luxury homes, and restaurants. It also hosts Langrug, an informal settlement of 1,858 homes which between 2011 and 2012 undertook a community-driven upgrading process known as re-blocking. The residents of this dense flood- and fire-prone settlement are responding to the frustration born out of a national housing deficit. Despite the housing gains made since apartheid, some 2 million South Africans live in informal settlements and slums throughout the country, primarily in urban centres. In Stellenbosch, public housing provision is slow: the Informal Settlement Network (ISN) estimates that it would take 100 years to meet the municipality’s housing needs at current construction rates. In the meantime, the poor conditions within Langrug fostered crime and created an unsanitary environment: grey water trickling into a neighboring farm caused unending friction between the farmer, municipality, and Langrug.

Project: In 2009, ISN and CORC were approached by municipal officials to act as intermediaries between the city and Langrug; it was hoped the NGOs could help overcome the decades of mistrust between Langrug residents and the municipality, and thus spark the reblocking process. Following two years of establishing a partnership, upgrading of informal settlements really began in late 2010 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the City Council, mayor, municipal officials, and the SDI Alliance, an umbrella non-profit organization aiming to improve the living conditions of the urban poor which includes ISN/CORC. The Memorandum established an institutional arrangement between signatories, as well as the intervention and action plan to upgrade communities in Stellenbosch, beginning with the pilot site of Langrug.

Active in informal communities throughout the country, ISN was able to demonstrate to residents of Langrug the success of the reblocking process in the nearby community of Philipi. Following this and workshops explaining the intricacies of reblocking, Langrug residents decided to move ahead with re-blocking, a process which, according to SDI, “re-arranges shacks in densely-packed settlements to open up common public space, access roads, and basic service infrastructure installation.” Re-blocking allows communities to rebuild on the land where they live, avoiding resettlement and preserving social and economic ties. It was agreed that re-blocking would occur incrementally, block by block. This “in-situ” community upgrading means that at any one time only a few infrastructure and household improvements would be taking place, preserving daily rhythms and avoiding mass dislocation.

From the outset, integrating shack dwellers and local leadership into the upgrading process was a key objective. The first step was to conduct a thorough survey of Langrug (known as an enumeration) in order to collect basic demographic data and assess the deficits in critical infrastructure, such as water taps and toilets. Undertaken by local volunteers, the enumeration revealed the extent of the underprovision of services in Langrug: in one subdivision, there were no toilets and only one tap for 604 people/318 shacks. The enumeration process not only better connected and organized the community, but also allowed it to begin a dialogue on what residents needed from the municipality and where.

Results: In addition to a host of planned infrastructure works, the partnership between Langrug, the NGOs, and the Municipality has shown that such a community-driven upgrading process can indeed lead to successful improvements for a poor community. As a pilot, the Langrug has laid the groundwork for the upgrading of other settlements. Additionally, the relationship between the Municipality and Langrug residents has never been stronger: productive, trusting dialogue now exists, reducing community friction to urban planning projects while also providing the community more voice and veto power in such projects. This new relationship best showed itself when the Municipality approached Langrug residents about installing a road, which required the resettlement of 14 families. Rather than sparking a series of protests and top-down eviction orders, a participatory approach was taken to resettle the families that had the full support of the community.

Years: 1990 – 2010

Background: Since the early 1980s, Tunisia and Morocco have established programmes to reduce the number of slums, expand affordable housing opportunities and improve the provision of urban services.

Projects:

ARRU in Tunisia: Tunisia has essentially eliminated all its bidonvilles (slums) through a programme managed by the public enterprise, Agence de Réhabilitation et de Rénovation Urbaine (ARRU). ARRU was established under the Ministry of Infrastructure, Housing and Land Use Planning. Its mandate is to renovate and rehabilitate urban areas and promote real estate development. Since its inception, ARRU has acted to control urban sprawl, improve conditions in the older districts, regularise substandard fringe settlements, offer loans for housing construction and improvements and provide basic services including potable water, sanitation, schools and health facilities, especially to the urban poor. From 2002 to 2009, ARRU spent over USD 72 million on urban projects that have improved living conditions for 1,140,000 people.

The success of these interventions can be attributed to ARRU’s effective coordination  of public authorities, specifically its willingness to cooperate and collaborate with local agencies. This is particularly important as decentralization has devolved functions and responsibilities to local authorities and given them a more prominent role in planning and management. ARRU has also formed partnerships with the private sector to ensure effective and efficient implementation of programs and projects.

Plans for Housing in an Al Omrane project

Al Omrane, Morroco: Morocco has initiated a forceful intervention to resettle bidonville dwellers and managed to reduce the number of slums by 65 per cent from 1990 to 2010. Al Omrane, established in 2004, is a government-owned holding company that has integrated the functions previously held by three different government agencies (Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre l’Habitat Insalubre; Attacharouk Co.; and Société Nationale d’équipement et de construction). It acts through 14 regional subsidiaries and its activities include four major programmes:

• Social Housing production (MAD 140,000/house
• Rehousing bidonville dwellers (Cities without Slums);
• Construction of housing in the southern provinces;
• Development of new towns

Through these projects, Al Omrane has rehoused families from makeshift dwellings, upgraded underserviced neighbourhoods, regularised land tenure in informal settlements and developed new towns and urban expansion zones, with a significant portion of land dedicated to affordable housing. From 2004 to 2009, Al Omrane completed 724,000 housing  units which included rehousing of 143,000 families living in shacks, increasing the number of cities and towns without slums to 38. In 2009, the holding company completed 176,843 housing units (114,459 for urban and rural upgrading activities commissioned by the national and local authorities, 9,627 produced in cooperation with the private sector and 52,757 for Al Omrane’s own production). It re-housed 18,300 families living in shacks.

In 2010, Al Omrane programmed the construction of 107,400 units, of which 33,000 are earmarked for lower income  residents (units at MAD 140,000 or USD 17,800), 37,200 for moderate-income households and 37,200 for sale at market rate. The market rate units will cross-subsidize the units allocated to the lower-income households. Al Omrane planned to rehouse 30,000 families living in shacks, adding another 24 cities and towns to the Cities without Slums list.

Financing: About 65 per cent of the funding for ARRU’s projects targeting lower income families originates from the National Solidarity Fund. Through this fund, municipalities can borrow money to complete local infrastructure projects and community facilities as well as transfer funds to ARRU to undertake projects. The remaining support comes from the Housing Fund, government departments and the private sector.

Through 2009, the cumulative cost of the Al Omrane programme was MAD 35.9 billion (USD 4.6 billion)

Sources:

As quoted in UN-Habitat’s State of the Arab Cities 2012: Challenges of Urban Transition. I2UD Vice President Mona Serageldin was the lead author of the report, with support from I2UD staff.

Agence de réhabilitation et de rénovation urbaine (ARRU). (2011). UN-Habitat. (2010). State of the World’s Cities Report 2010. Nairobi: UN-Habitat. Al Omrane. (2010). www.alomrane.ma

Location: Khartoum, Sudan

Year: 1991